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Constitutional Issues Posed in
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of
2005
by
Erwin Chemerinsky*
The stated purpose of the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(“BAPCPA”)1 is to “improve bankruptcy law and
practice by restoring personal responsibility and
integrity in the bankruptcy system and ensure that
the
system
is
fair
for
both
debtors
and
2
Its legislative history stretches
creditors.”
over almost a decade, but each iteration of it
continued the same core features, the most
predominant of which is a complex “means test” to
determine whether a debtor may file a Chapter 7
case.3
This
Article
seeks
to
identify
the
constitutional
issues
most
likely
raised
by
BAPCPA.
It cannot identify all that might
possibly arise, as experience with the law will
generate many questions that I cannot presently
anticipate.
Nor does it attempt to provide
*

Erwin Chemerinsky is the Alston & Bird Professor of Law, Duke
University School of Law.
The author thanks Kimberly Kisabeth for
her excellent research assistance.
1 S. 256, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
2 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1 (2005).
3 Failure to satisfy the means test is presumptive abuse of Chapter
7, and the disqualified debtor either must file for reorganization
under Chapter 11 or 13 or refrain from filing.
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definitive answers to the constitutional questions
it raises. Instead, the objective is to identify
for judges and practitioners the constitutional
questions they are likely to see, summarize the
applicable constitutional law, and anticipate the
arguments that will be made.
Specifically, this Article focuses on the
following constitutional questions that might
arise under BAPCPA: Do BAPCPA’s requirements for
the content of attorney advertising violate the
First Amendment?
Does its regulation of the
advice attorneys may give their debtor clients
violate the First Amendment?
Does its regulation
of attorney conduct violate the Tenth Amendment or
separation of powers?
Would an involuntary
Chapter 11 case that required payments over a
five-year period constitute impermissible peonage?
Does the means test violate the uniformity
requirement or equal protection?
Do the debtor
disclosure requirements violate the right to
privacy?
Do the limits imposed on certain
judicial actions violate separation of powers?

I. DO REQUIREMENTS FOR ATTORNEYS’
ADVERTISEMENTS VIOLATE THE FIRST
AMENDMENT?
BAPCPA requires consumer bankruptcy lawyers to
identify themselves in advertisements as “debt
relief agencies” and to state: “We help people
file for bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy
Code.”4
This content-based regulation of speech
raises First Amendment issues.
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE COURT’S PERSPECTIVE ON ATTORNEY
ADVERTISING
“Constitutional

protection

for

attorney

4 11. U.S.C. § 528(a)(4) & (b)(2)(B); see infra text accompanying
notes 42-46.

793CHEMERINSKYFINAL

200x)

9/6/2005 1:57 PM

DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE

103

advertising, and for commercial speech generally,
is of recent vintage.”5 In Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, the Arizona Bar had disciplined two
attorneys for advertising their legal clinic in a
local newspaper in violation of the Arizona Bar’s
blanket rule prohibiting attorney advertisements.6
The Supreme Court ruled that the disciplinary rule
violated the First Amendment.7
Although the Court acknowledged that “[t]he
interest of the States in regulating lawyers is
especially great since lawyers are essential to
the primary governmental function of administering
justice, and have historically been ‘officers of
the courts,’”8 the Court demanded additional
justification for the regulation, and eventually
struck the ban on price advertising for what it
deemed “routine” legal services: “the uncontested
divorce, the simple adoption, the uncontested
personal bankruptcy, the change of name, and the
like.”9
“Expressing
confidence
that
legal
advertising would only be practicable for such
simple, standardized services, the Court rejected
the
State’s
proffered
justifications
for
regulation.”10
Although the Court acknowledged
5 Florida

Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 622 (1995).
v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 356 (1977).
7 Id. at 382.
The Court stated that its conclusion was consistent
with Virginia Pharmacy in that the disciplinary rule at hand also
served to inhibit the free flow of commercial information and promote
public ignorance. Id. at 365, citing Virginia State Pharmacy Bd. v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
(holding that the First Amendment protected from state regulation the
right of pharmacists to engage in “commercial speech” by advertising
prescription drug prices); see also In re R.M.J. 455 U.S. 191 (1982);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S.
626 (1985).
8 Bates, 433 U.S. at 361-62, quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
9 Id. at 372.
10 Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 623.
In Bates, the Supreme Court
applied the three-prong test and stated that it was not persuaded by
any of the state’s proffered justifications for its restriction of
price advertising by attorneys, including: (1) the adverse effect on
professionalism; (2) the inherently misleading nature of attorney
6 Bates
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that there could be reasonable restrictions on the
time, place and manner of advertising,11 it held
that advertising by attorneys could not be
subjected to blanket suppression. The Court noted
that it was in the public interest to increase use
of legal services, and viewed advertising as a
legitimate vehicle to provide the public with
information about the nature and cost of such
services.12
Nearly two decades of cases built upon the Bates
opinion have firmly established lawyer advertising
as commercial speech entitled to First Amendment
protection.13
The level of scrutiny with which the Court will
evaluate
any
state
restriction
on
attorney
advertising against First Amendment protections
depends
on
the
nature
or
effect
of
the
restriction.
State restrictions that result in
less than a complete prohibition of attorneys’
non-misleading
advertising14
must
serve
a
substantial state interest to avoid running afoul
of the First Amendment.15 Disclosure requirements
imposed by the state on attorney advertising must
be reasonably related to the state’s interest in
preventing consumer deception.
advertising; (3) the adverse effect on the administration of justice;
(4) the undesirable economic effects of advertising; (5) the adverse
effect of advertising on the quality of service; and (6) the
difficulties of enforcement absent wholesale restriction. Bates, 433
U.S. at 368-79.
11 Id. at 384.
12 Id. at 376.
See Daniel Callender, Attorney Advertising and the
Use of Dramatization in Television Advertisements, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV.
(Special Section) 89, 97 (2001).
13 See, e.g., Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 623; Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637; In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 199 (1982).
14 Regulation of misleading advertising is discussed below, infra
text accompanying notes 16-18.
15 Bates, 433 U.S. at 383 (“Advertising that is false, deceptive, or
misleading of course is subject to restraint.
Since the advertiser
knows his product and has a commercial interest in its dissemination,
we have little worry that regulation to assure truthfulness will
discourage protected speech.”) (citation omitted).
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The Court noted in Bates that its holding—that
advertising by attorneys is commercial speech
protected by the First Amendment and may not be
subjected to blanket suppression—did not foreclose
regulation
of
advertising
that
was
false,
The majority did not
deceptive, or misleading.16
believe regulation to assure truthfulness would
discourage protected speech, and any concern
regarding potential inhibition of spontaneity
seemed inapplicable because commercial speech was
generally of a calculated nature.
In this
context, the Court held misstatements that might
be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other
advertising might be especially harmful given the
public’s lack of sophistication regarding legal
services.17
Claims as to the quality of services
are also not easily subject to measurement or
verification, and therefore more likely to be so
misleading as to warrant restriction.18
The Supreme Court stated in In re R.M.J. that
Bates and subsequent cases made it clear that the
imposition of appropriate restrictions on attorney
advertising is permissible when the particular
advertising in question is inherently likely to
deceive or where the record indicated that a
particular form or method of advertising had in
fact been deceptive.19
Furthermore, false and
deceptive
advertising
could
be
prohibited
20
entirely.
However, states may not place an
16 Id.

at 372.
at 375.
18 Id. at 384.
19 455 U.S. 191, 200-01 (1982).
20 “Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to
the protections of the First Amendment.
But when the particular
content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently
misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such
advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate
restrictions. Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely. But
the States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of
potentially misleading information, e.g., a listing of areas of
practice, if the information also may be presented in a way that is
not deceptive.”
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1982) (citing
17 Id.
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absolute
prohibition
on
certain
types
of
potentially misleading information in attorney
advertisements—such
as
the
listing
of
an
attorney’s area of practice—if such information
also may be presented in a way that is not
deceptive.
Any restriction on such information
only may be as broad as reasonably necessary to
prevent deception.21
Government regulation of non-misleading attorney
advertising is analyzed under the commercial
speech framework set forth by Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission
of New York.22
In Central Hudson, the Court held
that government may freely regulate commercial
speech that is misleading or concerns unlawful
activity.23 Commercial speech outside of those two
categories may be regulated if: (1) a substantial
government
interest
exists
in
support
of
regulation;24 (2) the restriction directly and
materially advances that interest; and (3) the
restriction is “narrowly drawn.”25
Bates, 433 U.S. at 375). See also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
21 R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
22 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
23 Id. at 563-64.
24 With
respect to attorneys’ advertisements, the intermediate
standard of review for analyzing commercial speech restrictions under
the free speech guarantee of the Constitution’s First Amendment does
not permit the reviewing court to supplant the precise interests put
forward by a state with other suppositions; however, one substantial
state interest is sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the
intermediate standard’s three-prong test. Florida Bar v. Went For It,
Inc., 515 U.S. 515 U.S. 618, 624-25 (1995); see also Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995) (deeming only one of the
government’s proffered interests “substantial”).
25 See R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203 (holding that in order for a state to
regulate non-misleading attorney advertising, the state must assert a
substantial interest and the interference with speech must be in
proportion to the interest served).
The Court also noted that
“[a]lthough the potential for deception and confusion is particularly
strong
in
the
context
of
advertising
professional
services,
restrictions upon such advertising may be no broader than reasonably
necessary to prevent the deception.” Id. See also Zauderer, 471 U.S.
626 (1985) (indicating that attorney advertising was covered by the
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In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
Supreme Court, the Court rejected an attorney’s
contention that state disciplinary rules imposing
certain
disclosure
requirements
on
attorney
advertising must do so by the least restrictive
means
in
order
to
conform
with
the
First
The Court held an attorney’s rights
Amendment.26
as an advertiser are adequately protected as long
as disclosure requirements are reasonably related
to
the
state’s
interest
in
preventing
the
deception of consumers.27
Since the extension of
First Amendment protection to commercial speech
was justified principally by the value of the
information provided to consumers by such speech,
attorneys have a minimal interest in providing
information that is not factual in nature.28
The
opinion emphasized, however, that unjustified or
unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might
offend the First Amendment by chilling protected
commercial speech.29
State laws and rules restricting attorney
advertisements concerning subject matter areas of
legal practice have been held to violate the First
Amendment.
In In re R.M.J.,30 the Supreme Court
held that a state’s disciplinary rule that limited
the includible areas of practice to one or more of
a list of twenty-three and provided no flexibility
in phrasing such practice areas was an invalid
restriction upon speech.
The advertisement in
question appeared in a newspaper and telephone

doctrine that commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and
does not concern unlawful activities may be restricted only in the
service of a substantial governmental interest, and only through
means that directly advance that interest); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (observing that state regulation of lawyer
advertising may extend only as far as the interest such regulation
serves).
26 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 673.
30 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
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directory and (1) listed areas of practice using
different phraseology than specified by the rule,
and (2) advertised for services in several areas
of law for which there was no analogous term in
the rule’s list.31 The Court stated its conclusion
was also based on the fact that (1) the listing
published by the attorney had not been shown to be
misleading, and (2) the committee of the state’s
highest court responsible for prosecuting attorney
disciplinary
proceedings
had
suggested
no
substantial state interest served by the rule’s
restriction.32
Similarly, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, the Court ruled that advertisements
presenting truthful, non-deceptive information and
advice regarding a potential client’s legal rights
were neither misleading nor deceptive.33
In
Zauderer,
an
Ohio
attorney
advertised
legal
services for women injured by the Dalkon Shield
Intrauterine Device.34 The Office of Disciplinary
Counsel charged him with violating rules that
prohibited self-recommendation and the acceptance
of employment based on unsolicited legal advice.
The Court held that the advertisement was not
false or deceptive because the attorney never
promised litigation would be successful or that he
had any special expertise in handling lawsuits
involving the Dalkon Shield, and it could not be
prohibited on that basis.35 The Court then applied
the Central Hudson test and rejected the proffered
state interests as insufficient to support the
regulation.36
31 The attorney advertised using the terms “personal injury” and
“real estate” instead of “tort law” and “property law,” respectively,
and listed unanalogous areas such as “contract,” “zoning & land use,”
“communication,” and “pension & profit sharing plans.” Id. at 205.
32 Id.
33 471 U.S. 626, 639 (1985).
34 Id. at 630-31.
35 Id. at 640-41.
36 Id. at 642 (“[A]lthough some sensitive souls may have found the
appellant’s advertisement in poor taste, it can hardly be said to

793CHEMERINSKYFINAL

200x)

9/6/2005 1:57 PM

DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE

109

In the context of commercial speech, the Court
has also found the following state interests
(2)
substantial:
(1)
conserving
energy,37
maintaining standards of licensed professionals,38
(3) preventing solicitation that involves “fraud,
undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and
other
forms
of
‘vexatious
conduct,’”39
(4)
protecting the privacy and tranquility of the
home,40 and (5) preserving the reputation of the
legal profession.41
B. BAPCPA’S REGULATION OF ATTORNEY ADVERTISING
BAPCPA adds new Code42 §§ 526, 527 and 528 which
proscribe and prescribe certain activities of some
bankruptcy lawyers.
A lawyer who provides any
bankruptcy assistance to an “assisted person” is
defined to be a “debt relief agency.”43 While the
principal target of this definition probably was
have invaded the privacy of those who read it.”).
37 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568.
38 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n., 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978);
Florida Bar v. Went For It, 515 U.S. 618, 624 (1995).
39 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462.
40 Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 625.
41 Id.
But see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.
626 (1985) (noting that the state has a substantial interest in
ensuring dignified behavior in the courtroom, but that the state’s
interest in the protection of the dignity of the legal profession was
not substantial enough to justify restricting free speech rights
under the First Amendment).
42 Unless otherwise indicated, citations to the Bankruptcy Code (the
“Code”) are to 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., as amended by BAPCPA.
43 Code § 101(12A), added by BAPCPA, defines a “debt relief agency”
as “any person who provides any bankruptcy assistance to an assisted
person in return for the payment of money or other valuable
consideration, or who is a bankruptcy petition preparer under section
110,” subject to certain exclusions.
This definition could include
attorneys, document preparers and for-profit credit counselors (§
501(c)(3) nonprofit entities being specifically excluded from the
definition), but this Article will focus solely on BAPCPA’s
application to attorneys.
For a more detailed analysis of BAPCPA’s
regulation of debt relief agencies, see Henry J. Sommer, Trying to
Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the
“Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,” 79
AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 206-11 (2005) (hereafter “Sommer”).
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consumer debtor lawyers and petition preparers,
the definition of “assisted person”44 is not
limited to debtors or prospective debtors, so it
could include creditors and landlords.
And
although the debts of an “assisted person” must be
primarily
consumer
debts,
the
bankruptcy
assistance need not be provided with respect to
the person’s debts.
Therefore an individual
landlord, most of whose debts are consumer debts,
could be an “assisted person” even when the
bankruptcy advice pertains to the landlord’s
rights in the bankruptcy case of a tenant.45
New Code §§ 527 and 528 require certain
disclosures and statements to be made by a “debt
relief agency.”
Within three business days of
first offering to provide bankruptcy advice to an
“assisted person,” the debt relief agency must
provide a clear and conspicuous written notice,
some of which may be inaccurate and most of which
would be irrelevant to a creditor client.46
New
Code § 528 requires that within five days of first
providing bankruptcy assistance services to an
assisted person, a debt relief agency must execute
44 “The term ‘assisted person’ means any person whose debts consist
primarily of consumer debts and the value of whose nonexempt property
is less than $150,000.” Code § 101(3).
45 Accord, Sommer, supra note 43, at 211.
46 The debt relief agency must provide the assisted person with the
notice the clerk must provide upon filing a case pursuant to Code §
342(b)(1), and a clear and conspicuous written notice that all
information required to be provided by the assisted person during a
bankruptcy case must be complete, accurate and truthful, that all
assets and liabilities must be completely disclosed, that “the
replacement value of each asset as defined in section 506 must be
stated in those documents where requested after reasonable inquiry to
establish such value,” that current monthly income and disposable
income are required to be disclosed after reasonable inquiry, that
information an assisted person provides during a case may be audited,
and that failure to provide such information may result in dismissal
of the case or criminal sanctions.
Code § 527(a)(2).
Code § 506
does not require replacement value for any assets except collateral
for secured debts in certain cases, replacement value may not be the
basis for valuing exempt assets, and none of the required schedules
and statements of affairs specifically requests replacement value.
Accord, Sommer, supra note 43, at 210.
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a written contract with the person that explains
the services the agency will provide and the fees
for such services.
It also requires that any
advertisement of bankruptcy assistance services,
or assistance with respect to credit defaults,
mortgage
foreclosures,
evictions,
or
debt
problems, include the following or substantially
similar statement: “We are a debt relief agency.
We help people file for bankruptcy relief under
the Bankruptcy Code.”
These statements and disclosures are required
regardless of whether the debt relief agency in
fact represents consumer debtors in bankruptcy
cases.
They would seem to apply to a purely
creditor’s lawyer if one or more of the lawyer’s
clients has debts that are primarily consumer
debts, even if the representation is not with
respect to those debts but instead deals only with
the creditor’s claims in a bankruptcy case.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL
ADVERTISING

ISSUES

IN

REGULATING

THE

CONTENT

OF

Those objecting to these provisions are likely
to argue that they violate the First Amendment
because they are not “narrowly drawn”47 and, in
fact,
increase
the
likelihood
of
misleading

47 See In re R.M.J. 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (holding that in order
for a state to regulate non-misleading attorney advertising, the
state must assert a substantial interest and the interference with
speech must be in proportion to the interest served). The Court also
noted that “[a]lthough the potential for deception and confusion is
particularly strong in the context of advertising professional
services, restrictions upon such advertising may be no broader than
reasonably necessary to prevent the deception.”
Id.
See also
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S.
626 (1985) (indicating that attorney advertising was covered by the
doctrine that commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and
does not concern unlawful activities may be restricted only in the
service of a substantial governmental interest, and only through
means that directly advance that interest); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (observing that state regulation of lawyer
advertising may extend only as far as the interest such regulation
serves).
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speech.
Those challenging the regulation will
argue that the new “debt-relief agency” provisions
are so overinclusive that they will actually
create
more
confusion
among
debtors
seeking
assistance.
Entities that represent creditors
might be deemed debt-relief agencies under the
broad language of the provisions.
Moreover, the provisions of BAPCPA fail to
distinguish between attorneys and non-attorneys
Under current
providing bankruptcy services.48
law, only attorneys are permitted to give legal
advice, file pleadings, or represent debtors in
bankruptcy hearings.
Also, unlike non-attorney
bankruptcy petition preparers, only attorneys are
licensed by the state in which they practice,
bound by ethical requirements, and subject to
discipline by the courts in which they practice.
Further, only communications between the debtor
and his attorney are protected by the attorneyclient privilege.
Therefore, the provisions are
likely to confuse the public by requiring both
attorneys and non-attorney bankruptcy petition
preparers to advertise themselves as “debt relief
agencies.”
I believe that creditors’ lawyers will have a
strong argument that their First Amendment rights
are violated when they have to make the false
statement, “We are a debt relief agency. We help
people file for bankruptcy.”
In light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in R.M.J., any compulsory
disclosures are of questionable constitutionality,
but especially when the government is requiring
false statements.
However, this is a challenge
that creditors’ lawyers will need to bring.
The
Supreme Court has been clear that the overbreadth
doctrine does not apply to commercial speech49 and
48 Under

BAPCPA, any “person,” including both attorneys and
“bankruptcy petition preparers,” who assists debtors with their
bankruptcies in return for compensation, is deemed to be a “debtrelief agency.”
49 Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipsides Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
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thus a debtor’s attorney cannot challenge the law
on the ground that it is unconstitutional as
applied to creditors’ lawyers.

II. DOES BAPCPA’S PROHIBITION OF
ATTORNEYS’ ADVICE VIOLATE THE FIRST
AMENDMENT?
A. BAPCPA’S PROHIBITIONS ON ATTORNEY ADVICE
New Code § 526 imposes restrictions on the kind
of advice such a “debt relief agency” can provide.
Most
of
this
prohibited
advice
would
be
inappropriate for other reasons, such as making
misrepresentations,50 but one of them might be
entirely appropriate: Code § 526(a)(4) forbids a
debt relief agency to advise an assisted person or
prospective assisted person to incur additional
debt in contemplation of filing for bankruptcy
relief or for the purpose of paying fees for
services rendered by an attorney or petition
preparer in connection with the bankruptcy case.51
This prohibition is particularly troubling when
it might be completely legal and even desirable
for the client to incur such debt.
For example,
there may be instances where it is advisable for a
455 U.S. 489, 496-97 (1982) (overbreadth does not apply in commercial
speech cases).
50 Code § 526(a)(1) prohibits a debt relief agency from failing to
perform any service that it had informed the assisted person that it
would provide in connection with a case or proceeding under Title 11.
Section 526(a)(2) prohibits a debt relief agency from making any
untrue or misleading statement, or advising any assisted person to
make any such untrue or misleading statement.
Section 526(a)(3)
prohibits a debt relief agency from misrepresenting to any assisted
person the services that the agency will provide or the benefits and
risks from being a debtor in a bankruptcy case.
51 Code § 526(a)(4) (a debt relief agency shall not “advise an
assisted person to incur more debt in contemplation of such person
filing a case under this title or to pay an attorney or bankruptcy
petition preparer fee or charge for services performed as part of
preparing for or representing a debtor in a case under this title”).
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client to obtain a mortgage, to refinance an
existing mortgage to obtain a lower interest rate,
or to buy a new car on time.
There would be no
fraud in doing so if the client intended to pay
such
debt
notwithstanding
the
filing
of
a
contemplated bankruptcy case.
For example, the
client may intend to keep all payments fully
current and to reaffirm such debt once the case is
filed.
Moreover, most of an attorney’s fee for handling
a Chapter 13 case is paid over time through the
Chapter 13 plan. But that means that at the time
the case is filed, the client has incurred
additional debt in contemplation of filing a
bankruptcy
case.
Indeed,
such
debt
was
specifically incurred for the purpose of paying
the fees of the attorney filing the case.
But § 526(a)(4) appears to prohibit any attorney
from advising a client to incur any such debt,
regardless of how appropriate or advisable.
The
clause directly regulates the content of speech of
lawyers to their clients, even when it is
accurate, legal, and desirable.
In addition to
First Amendment considerations on this issue,
there are strong public policy considerations
implicated when the government restricts the type
of advice attorneys can give their clients.
B. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF ATTORNEY SPEECH
The Supreme Court has been very protective of
the First Amendment rights of attorneys to advise
and zealously represent their clients.52 Also, the
Supreme Court has explained that a central
principle of the First Amendment is that contentbased restrictions on speech must meet strict
scrutiny, while content-neutral regulation only
need meet intermediate scrutiny.
In Turner
53
Broadcasting System v. FCC,
Justice Kennedy,
52 Legal
53 512

Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548-49 (2001).
U.S. 622 (1994).

793CHEMERINSKYFINAL

200x)

9/6/2005 1:57 PM

DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE

115

writing for the majority, noted that “[g]overnment
action that stifles speech on account of its
message, or that requires the utterance of a
particular message favored by the Government,
contravenes
this
essential
[First
Amendment]
Justice Kennedy explained, “For these
right.”54
reasons, the First Amendment, subject only to
narrow and well-understood exceptions, does not
countenance governmental control over the content
of messages expressed by private individuals.”55
I think that this is likely the strongest basis
for
a
constitutional
challenge
to
BAPCPA.
Preventing lawyers from giving important, lawful
information to their clients cannot be reconciled
with the First Amendment.
However, the Court is
likely to declare this provision unconstitutional
as applied, rather than on its face.
In recent
years,
the
Court
has
stressed
its
strong
preference for as-applied challenges, rather than
facial challenges, to the constitutionality of
federal laws.56
The Court has said that a facial
challenge
requires
demonstrating
that
all
applications
of
the
law
would
be
unconstitutional.57 That is not likely with regard
to these provisions of BAPCPA.
Instead, courts
are likely to hold that it is unconstitutional to
prohibit lawyers from giving truthful, lawful
information to their clients, and that it is
unconstitutional to require attorneys to put false
information in their advertisements.

III.
54 Id.

DOES FEDERAL REGULATION OF
at 641.

55 Id.
56 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1948-49
(2004).
57 United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (“A facial
challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid. . . .
[W]e have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine
outside the limited context of the First Amendment.”) (due process
challenge to the Bail Reform Act).
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ATTORNEYS VIOLATE THE TENTH AMENDMENT
OR SEPARATION OF POWERS?
A. THE STATES’ ROLE IN REGULATING ATTORNEYS
The regulation of attorneys is an important
governmental function in the administration of
justice and the responsibility has historically
been reserved to and performed by the states.58
Throughout American history, the licensing and
regulation of lawyers has been left exclusively to
the
states.
The
states
prescribe
the
qualifications for admission to practice and the
standards of professional conduct.59
As summarized in Hoover v. Ronwin:
[T]he regulation of the activities of
the bar is at the core of the State’s
power to protect the public. . . . The
interest of the States in regulating
lawyers
is
especially
great
since
lawyers are essential to the primary
governmental function of administering
justice, and have historically been
“officers of the courts.” . . .
Few
other professions are as close to the
“core of the State’s power to protect
the public.” Nor is any trade or other
profession as “essential to the primary
governmental function of administering
justice.”60
58 Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979) (per curiam) (“Since the
founding of the Republic, the licensing and regulation of lawyers has
been left exclusively to the States and the District of Columbia
within their respective jurisdictions.”); Fred C. Zacharias, The
Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: Confronting Lies,
Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L.
REV. 829, 858 (2002) (noting that the states have traditionally
exercised the power left to them in this area).
59 Leis, 439 U.S. at 442.
60 466 U.S. 555, 568 n.18 (1984), quoting Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 361-62 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
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The Supreme Court has long recognized that the
states’
interest
in
disciplining
lawyers
is
“incident to their broader responsibility for
keeping the administration of justice and the
standards of professional conduct unsullied.”61
The states’ interests implicated in BAPCPA are
particularly strong.
In addition to its general
interest in protecting consumers and regulating
commercial
transactions,
the
states
bears
a
special responsibility for maintaining standards
among members of the licensed professions.
In addition, under the doctrine of separation of
powers, the courts are afforded the inherent power
to regulate admission to the practice of law by
prescribing minimum levels of competency, to set
standards
for
continuing
legal
practice,
to
oversee the conduct of attorneys as officers of
the court, and to control and supervise the
practice of law both in and out of court.62
Therefore, the power to regulate the actual
practice of law, including the power to discipline
attorneys, appears to be among the inherent powers
of the courts.63
In fact, every state in the
United States recognizes that the power to admit
and
to
discipline
attorneys
rests
in
the
judiciary.64 “This is necessarily so. An attorney
is an officer of the court and whether a person
shall be admitted [or disciplined] is a judicial,
and not a legislative, question.”65
In
addition
to
its
general
interest
in
protecting consumers and regulating commercial
transactions, states bear a special responsibility
for maintaining standards among members of the

421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975), and In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722-23
(1973).
61 Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 123-24 (1961).
62 In re Attorney Discipline System, 19 Cal. 4th 582, 967 P.2d 49,
54 (Cal. 1998).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
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The important difference
licensed professions.66
between regulation of the legal profession and
regulation of other professions is that admission
to the bar is a judicial function, and members of
the bar are officers of the court, subject to
discipline by the court.
Hence, the states and
the courts appear to share the power to regulate
attorneys.
B. BAPCPA PRESCRIBES PENALTIES
RELIEF AGENCY PROVISIONS

FOR

VIOLATIONS

OF

DEBT

BAPCPA imposes various penalties for violations
of §§ 526, 527 or 528.
First, any contract
between a debt relief agency and an assisted
person that does not comply with these provisions
is void and may not be enforced by any state or
federal court or by any person, except an assisted
person.67
Second, a debt relief agency is liable
to an assisted person for any fees or charges paid
by such person to the agency, plus actual damages
and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, for any
intentional or negligent failure to comply with §§
Third, a state official may
526, 527 and 528.68
seek to enjoin violations of these provisions or
to recover actual damages on behalf of assisted
persons arising from such violations, including
recovery of their fees, plus reasonable attorneys’
fees and costs.69 Fourth, the bankruptcy court, on
its own motion or on motion of the U.S. Trustee or
the debtor, may enjoin violations of these
provisions
or
“impose
an
appropriate
civil
penalty” for intentional violations or a clear and
consistent
pattern
of
violations
of
these

66 See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Semler v.
Oregon State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
67 Code § 526(c)(1).
68 Code § 526(c)(2)(A).
69 Code
§ 526(c)(3).
The federal district courts are given
concurrent jurisdiction over such state enforcement actions. Code §
526(c)(4).
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Finally, these provisions do not
provisions.70
preempt state bar associations and federal courts
from enforcing qualifications to practice.71
C. TENTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF BAPCPA’S ATTORNEY REGULATION
Undoubtedly, lawyers will argue that these
provisions are unconstitutional in regulating
attorneys and assuming control over a matter
traditionally left to the states.
The Supreme
Court’s decisions in New York v. United States,72
and Printz v. United States,73 revived the Tenth
Amendment
as
a
limit
on
federal
power.
Specifically, they held that Congress may not
“commandeer” states and coerce the states into
implementing federal policy. Thus, the claim will
be that BAPCPA violates the Tenth Amendment in
shifting
responsibility
over
this
aspect
of
regulating lawyers from states to the federal
government.
But the problem with this argument is that the
Supreme Court has not held that the Tenth
Amendment reserves a zone of activities for
exclusive state control.
Rather, the Tenth
Amendment decisions of the last fifteen years have
had a narrower focus: they establish that Congress
cannot compel state legislative or regulatory
activity. In New York v. United States, the Court
declared unconstitutional a federal law requiring
that state governments clean up their nuclear
wastes.
The Court explained that Congress was
commandeering the states and forcing them to adopt
laws and regulations. In Printz v. United States,
the Court held unconstitutional a provision of the
Brady Handgun Control Act that required state and
local law enforcement personnel to do background
checks
before
issuing
permits
for
firearms.
70 Code

§ 526(c)(5).
§ 526(d).
72 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
73 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
71 Code
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Again,
the
Court
found
that
Congress
was
impermissibly coercing states into enforcing a
federal mandate.
A challenge to BAPCPA on Tenth Amendment grounds
must, under these decisions, show that the federal
government is compelling states to enact laws or
regulations or implement a federal mandate. It is
not enough to argue that regulating lawyers is a
traditional responsibility of state governments.
The federal government’s assumption of functions
traditionally performed by the states is not a
violation of the Tenth Amendment under any of the
recent Supreme Court decisions. Moreover, it must
be remembered that federal courts long have
regulated the conduct of attorneys who appear
before them.
Nor is the separation of powers argument likely
to
succeed.
State
legislatures
long
have
regulated attorney conduct; there is no reason why
Congress
cannot
do
so
in
federal
courts.
Bankruptcy courts are created by Congress and it
is difficult to see why they cannot regulate who
is eligible to practice there and how they must
behave so long as Congress is not preventing
bankruptcy courts, as adjuncts of federal district
courts,
from
carrying
out
their
judicial
functions.

IV. WHETHER THE INVOLUNTARY CHAPTER 11
PLAN REQUIRING FIVE YEARS OF PAYMENTS
VIOLATES THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
Although a principal purpose of BAPCPA is to
cause more debtors to file Chapter 13 cases, it
does so solely by imposing new limits on the
filing of Chapter 7 cases while leaving the filing
of a Chapter 13 case purely voluntary.
BAPCPA
does not permit the filing of an involuntary
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Chapter 13 case.74
But BAPCPA for the first time makes all of an
individual
Chapter
11
debtor’s
postpetition
earnings property of the estate.75
And it
requires, upon objection by an unsecured creditor,
that all of the debtor’s projected disposable
income be devoted to the plan for five years
unless all unsecured claims are paid in full.76
Because an involuntary individual Chapter 11 case
remains
permissible
except
against
a
family
farmer,77 the required devotion of five years’
disposable earnings to a Chapter 11 plan may raise
Thirteenth Amendment peonage issues.
A. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF PEONAGE
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery and
involuntary
servitude.
In
1867,
Congress
abolished peonage, declared state laws sanctioning
it void, and made it a crime to hold anyone in “a
condition of peonage.”78
In sustaining and
enforcing these constitutional enactments, the
Supreme Court defined peonage as:
a status or condition of compulsory
service based upon the indebtedness of
the peon to the master. The basal fact
is
indebtedness . . .
[whether]
the
debtor voluntarily contracts to enter
the service of his creditor . . . [or
the servitude] is forced upon the
debtor by some provision of law. . . .
[P]eonage,
however
created,
is
compulsory
service,
involuntary
74 Code § 303(a), which provides that an “involuntary case may be
commenced only under chapter 7 or 11 of this title,” remains
unchanged by BAPCPA.
75 Code § 1115.
76 Code § 1129(a)(15).
77 Code § 303(a), unchanged by BAPCPA.
78 14 Stat. 546 (1967) (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1976 & Supp. V
1981) & U.S.C. § 1994 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
For a history of
peonage statutes, see Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 7-13 (1944).
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servitude.79
In addition, there must also be compulsory
service so that, for example, a taxpayer’s
allegation that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
officer demanded repayment of a nonexistent tax
debt and levied on the taxpayer’s property to
collect the debt is not “peonage” where the
taxpayer failed to allege that the officer held
him against his will or forced him to perform
The “essence [of
labor to satisfy the debt.80
peonage] is compulsory service in payment of a
debt. A peon is one who is compelled to work for
his creditor until his debt is paid.”81 Peonage is
a form of involuntary servitude.82
Several
courts
have
contended
that
the
elimination of peonage was one of the goals of the
Thirteenth Amendment,83 and the Amendment has
79 Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905); See also Bailey
v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911) (distinguished by Wilson v. State,
138 Ga. 489, 75 S.E. 619 (1912) and by State v. Mobile & O.R. Co.,
190 Ala. 409, 67 So. 286 (1914)). Under the peonage system a laborer
is absolutely bound to his employer.
He is absolutely compelled to
stay and labor until he has paid his indebtedness. If he attempts to
leave, or leaves, he can be restrained or forced to return.
The
employer can sell his unexpired term to anyone who will pay the
amount due and assume the obligations of the master.
State v.
Murray, 116 La. 655, 40 So. 930 (1906) (overruled in part on other
grounds by State v. Oliva, 144 La. 51, 80 So. 195 (1918)). Peonage
is involuntary servitude that involves the additional element of
being tied to the discharge of an indebtedness.
U. S. v. Shackney,
333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964) (distinguished by, U.S. v. Kozminski, 821
F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1987) and disagreement on other grounds
recognized by Sharp v. State, 245 Kan. 749, 783 P.2d 343 (1989)).
80 Del Elmer v. Metzger, 967 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal. 1997).
81 Bailey, 219 U.S. at 242.
82 Taylor
v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 29 (1942).
“Involuntary
servitude” is the coerced service of one person for another through
use, or threatened use, of law, physical force, or some other method
that causes the laborer to believe that the laborer has no
alternative to performing the service. Blair v. Checker Cab Co., 558
N.W.2d 439 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
It is an action by a master
causing a servant to have, or to believe he has, no way to avoid
continued service or confinement. Brooks v. George County, Miss., 84
F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 1996).
83 Lauren Kares, Note, The Unlucky Thirteenth: A Constitutional
Amendment In Search of a Doctrine, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 372, 385, n. 57
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regularly been invoked in decisions condemning
peonage.84 In fact, peonage had been forbidden at
common
law
by
the
time
the
Amendment
was
ratified.85
“The relevance of the Thirteenth
Amendment to peonage cases, besides providing a
convenient basis for congressional and judicial
rulemaking power, is that it provides a standard
by which to determine the voluntariness of labor
performed pursuant to a debt.”86
B. MAY DEBTORS BE COMPELLED TO PAY CREDITORS FROM FUTURE
WAGES?
The question whether debtors may be compelled to
pay creditors from future wages is not a new one,
although it is central to the new provision of the
Code.
The issue was raised long before the
current Code was enacted.
In 1934, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Local Loan
Co. v. Hunt,87 had occasion to consider whether a
bankruptcy debtor’s assignment of future wages
under
state
law
created
a
lien
that
was
nondischargeable under the federal bankruptcy law.
Creditors argued that Illinois case law held that
an assignment of future wages created a lien that
could not be discharged in bankruptcy.88
Without
(1995) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896)) (“This
infamous case that sanctioned ‘separate but equal’ accommodations for
African-Americans counted among the Amendment’s targets ‘Mexican
peonage [and] the Chinese coolie trade.’”)
84 See, e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944); Bailey, 219
U.S. 219; Clyatt, 197 U.S. 207.
85 Kares, supra note 83, at 385 n.59 (“Debtors’ prisons were already
a thing of the past when the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified, and
specific performance was not allowed as a remedy for breach of a
personal service contract.”).
See generally American Broadcasting
Co. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363, 366 (N.Y. 1981) (discussing courts’
longstanding refusal to compel labor in fulfillment of a legal
obligation).
86 Kares, supra note 83, at 385.
87 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
88 The underlying issue was not whether the lien was dischargeable
but whether there was a lien on future wages at all.
At the time,
authorities were split on the question of whether a lien could exist
prior to the debtor’s acquisition of the property that served as
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reaching the issue of whether such a lien would
constitute unconstitutional peonage, the Supreme
Court held that such state law was so subversive
of the fundamental policy of the Bankruptcy Act
that it need not be followed by a federal court of
bankruptcy:
One of the primary purposes of the
Bankruptcy Act is to “relieve the
honest
debtor
from
the
weight
of
oppressive indebtedness, and permit him
to
start
afresh
free
from
the
obligations
and
responsibilities
consequent
upon
business
misfortunes.” . . .
When a person assigns future wages, he,
in effect, pledges his future earning
power.
The power of the individual to
earn a living for himself and those
dependent upon him is in the nature of
a personal liberty quite as much if not
more than it is a property right.
To
preserve its free exercise is of the
utmost importance, not only because it
is a fundamental private necessity, but
because it is a matter of great public
concern.
From the viewpoint of the
wage-earner there is little difference
between not earning at all and earning
wholly for a creditor.
Pauperism may
be the necessary result of either. The
amount of the indebtedness, or the
proportion of wages assigned, may here
be small, but the principle, once
established, will equally apply where
collateral, i.e., a “floating lien.”
That issue was not finally
resolved until adoption of § 9-204 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
See, e.g., DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277, 1287 n.7 (9th Cir.
1969). But in Local Loan v. Hunt, the creditor argued that Illinois
law recognized the validity of such floating liens, which could
therefore apply to future wages. 292 U.S. at 243. The Supreme Court
did not decide that issue.
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both
are
very
great.
The
new
opportunity in life and the clear field
for future effort, which it is the
purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to afford
the emancipated debtor, would be of
little value to the wage-earner if he
were obliged to face the necessity of
devoting the whole or a considerable
portion
of
his
earnings
for
an
indefinite time in the future to the
payment of indebtedness incurred prior
to his bankruptcy.
Confining our
determination to the case in hand, and
leaving prospective liens upon other
forms of acquisitions to be dealt with
as they may arise, we reject the
Illinois decisions as to the effect of
an assignment of wages earned after
bankruptcy as being destructive of the
purpose and spirit of the Bankruptcy
Act.89
Chapter XIII wage earner reorganization was
formally introduced into the Bankruptcy Act of
1898 by the 1938 amendments effected by the
It was purely voluntary, and no
Chandler Act.90
provision of the Bankruptcy Act would disqualify
an individual debtor for “straight” bankruptcy
relief (the equivalent of the Code’s Chapter 7)
simply because the debtor could qualify for
Chapter XIII relief.
Nonetheless, in some
communities where Chapter XIII relief was used
extensively, “referees are not only hospitable,
but counsel and the credit community generally
encourage, if indeed they do not insist, that
wage-earner debtors in financial distress petition
for relief under Chapter XIII.”91
89 Local

Loan, 292 U.S. at 244-45 (citations omitted).
Stat. 840 (June 22, 1938).
91 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, Part I
at 158, H. Doc. 93-137, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. (1973) (hereafter “1970
Commission Report”).
90 52
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During the 90th Congress in 1967 an attempt was
made, but shot down, to deny straight bankruptcy
relief for any debtor who would qualify for a
Several arguments were made
Chapter XIII case.92
against the proposal, including the contention
that forcing an individual to work for creditors
would likely violate the Thirteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, which prohibits
In addition, lawmakers
involuntary servitude.93
believed that an involuntary wage-earner plan was
unworkable since “an unwilling debtor is less
likely to retain his job or to cooperate in the
repayment plan, and more often than not, the plan
would be pre-ordained to fail.”94
The 1970 Bankruptcy Commission also considered
and rejected the notion of requiring consumer
debtors
to
devote
future
income
to
debt
satisfaction as a condition of obtaining relief in
bankruptcy.95
The resilient efforts of creditor lobbyists in
this regard96 yielded some success in 1984 when
92 See Hearings on H.R. 1057 and H.R. 5771 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. (1967).
93 “To force unwilling wage earners to devote their future earnings
to payment of past debts smacked to some of debt peonage,
particularly when business debtors could not be subjected to the same
kind of regimen under the Bankruptcy Act.”
1970 Commission Report,
supra note 91, at 159.
94 H.R.
REP. NO. 95-595, at 120 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6081.
95 The
Commission has considered the arguments made for
conditioning the availability of bankruptcy relief,
including discharge, on a showing by the debtor that
he cannot obtain adequate relief from his condition of
financial distress by proposing a plan for payment of
his debts out of his future earnings. The Commission
has concluded that forced participation by a debtor in
a plan requiring contributions out of future income
has so little prospect for success that it should not
be adopted as a feature of the bankruptcy system.
1970 Commission Report, supra note 91, at 159.
96 “The credit industry has sought means testing consistently for at
least 30 years, but Congress has consistently refused to change the
basic structure of the consumer bankruptcy laws.”
REPORT OF THE NAT’L
BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N. 90-91 (October 1997) (hereafter “1997 Commission
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Congress added § 707(b) to the Bankruptcy Code,
authorizing a court to dismiss a case filed by an
individual
with
primarily
consumer
debts
if
granting relief would constitute “a substantial
abuse” of the provisions of Chapter 7 of the
This section has been widely interpreted
Code.97
by bankruptcy judges to provide for the dismissal
of a consumer debtor’s Chapter 7 case when the
debtor
has
the
financial
ability
to
make
meaningful repayments to creditors.98
The 1997 Commission Report considered numerous
proposals for “means testing” and other methods to
compel or encourage debtors to file Chapter 13
cases rather than Chapter 7.
After “intensive
review,” the Commission concluded that “[a]ccess
to Chapter 7 and to Chapter 13, the central
feature of the consumer bankruptcy system for
nearly 60 years, should be preserved.”99 The 1997
Commission Report did not address the peonage
issue, either with respect to means testing for
Chapter 7 or involuntary Chapter 11 cases.100
Several commentators have considered whether the
ordering of a divorced spouse to pay for the
future living expenses of the other by way of
alimony
constituted
peonage
or
involuntary

Report”).
97 See Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353 § 312, 98
Stat. 355.
98 E.g., Zolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908, 914 (9th Cir.
1988) (“[W]e hold that the debtor’s ability to pay his debts when
due, as determined by his ability to fund a chapter 13 plan, is the
primary factor to be considered in determining whether granting
relief would be a substantial abuse.”).
99 1997 Commission Report, supra note 96, at 91.
100 Two Commissioners filed a dissent that objected that the majority
in support of the Commission Report was only 5-4, proposed various
“means test” limits on the availability of Chapter 7 relief, and
“dismissed this odd notion” that compulsory payment of debts out of
future wages might constitute unconstitutional peonage by an
extensive quotation from In re Higginbotham, 111 B.R. 955, 966-67
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990).
Edith H. Jones and James I. Shepard,
Additional Dissent to Recommendations for Reform of Consumer
Bankruptcy Law 3, 16-23, 1997 Commission Report, supra note 96.

793CHEMERINSKYFINAL

128

AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL

9/6/2005 1:57 PM

(Vol. XX

This seems the closest analogue to
servitude.101
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
The
Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to directly
address this issue.102
But the practice of
requiring alimony, which necessitates employment,
occurs all over the country on a regular basis.
But the argument is not a frivolous one. Courts
have held that forced labor, with the threat of a
criminal punishment is peonage and violates the
Thirteenth Amendment.
This also applies to labor
forced after receiving an advance payment.103 The
Court’s rationale in Bailey v. Alabama was that
“the state could not avail itself of the sanction
of the criminal law to supply the compulsion (to
enforce labor) any more than it could use or
authorize the use of physical force.”104 One state
supreme court said of alimony: “[T]he question
facing the Court is whether a judicially imposed
system of involuntary servitude is to be continued
wherein one human being is placed in bondage to
another for what is effectively the remainder of
his natural life.”105
C. BAPCPA’S CHAPTER 11 PLAN REQUIREMENT FOR FIVE YEARS’
WAGES
Although BAPCPA has no direct effect on the
eligibility of individual debtors to file Chapter
11 cases,106 the new means test for filing a

101 See

e.g., Alfred J. Sciarrino & Susan K. Duke, Alimony: Peonage
or Involuntary Servitude?, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 67 (2003).
102 “It appears that in most instances the right case has not
presented itself, as appellants who might have been aggrieved have
generally voluntarily settled for a specific maintenance amount,
thereby failing to trigger Thirteenth Amendment involuntary servitude
restrictions.” Id. at 94.
103 Id. at 74.
104 Id. at 74-75 (citing Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 244 (1911)
and United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 943 (1988)).
105 Olsen
v. Olsen, 557 P.2d 604, 606 (1976) (Shepard, J.,
dissenting).
106 Code § 109(d), unchanged by BAPCPA.
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Chapter 7 case107 coupled with the unchanged
eligibility requirements for Chapter 13108 may
result in many more individual Chapter 11 cases
being
filed.
But
Chapter
11
has
been
significantly changed for individual debtors.
New Code § 1115 provides that for an individual
debtor, property of the estate includes, in
addition to all of the property identified in §
541: (1) all property of the kind described in §
541 that the debtor acquires after commencement of
the case and before the case is closed, dismissed
or converted, and (2) earnings from services
performed by the debtor after commencement of the
case and before the case is closed, dismissed or
converted.
New Code § 1141(d)(5) provides that
absent a hardship discharge,109 an individual
Chapter 11 debtor shall not receive a discharge
until “completion of all payments under the plan.”
Because the property acquired postpetition and the
earnings from postpetition services are property
of the estate until the case is closed, and
because the discharge will not be granted until
completion of all plan payments, all postpetition
earnings will continue to be property of the
estate for the duration of the plan.
New
§
1129(a)(15)
requires
that,
unless
unsecured creditors are paid in full or do not
object, the value of property to be distributed
107 Code

§ 707(b), substantially amended by BAPCPA.
§ 109(d), unchanged by BAPCPA, limits Chapter 13 to
individuals with regular income whose noncontingent, liquidated
unsecured and secured debts do not exceed $307,673 and $922,975,
respectively, subject to consumer price adjustments every three
years.
109 Code
§ 1141(d)(5)(B) provides that the court may grant a
discharge prior to completion of all plan payments if the value of
property actually distributed under the plan is not less than the
amount that would have been available for distribution if the debtor
had been liquidated under Chapter 7, and modification of the plan is
not practicable. The provision does not identify this as a hardship
discharge nor require the debtor to prove that the failure to make
plan payments is due to circumstances for which the debtor should not
be held accountable, as does the comparable provision for Chapter 13
cases, § 1328(b)(1).
108 Code
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under the plan must at least equal the debtor’s
projected disposable income (as defined in §
1325(b)(2)) to be received during the five-year
period beginning on the date that the first
payment is due under the plan or during the plan’s
term, whichever is longer.
And two new provisions increase the possibility
of creditors’ plans.
New Code § 1121(d)(2)
provides that the debtor’s exclusive right to file
a plan may not be extended beyond eighteen months
after the filing of the case.
And even if an
individual
debtor’s
plan
is
confirmed
and
substantially consummated, new Code § 1127(e)
permits an unsecured creditor or the U.S. Trustee
to seek modification of the plan to change the
amount of payments or to extend or reduce the time
period for payments under the plan.
As the essence of peonage is compulsory service
in payment of a debt,110 it is certain that it will
be argued that an involuntary individual Chapter
11 case coupled with the commitment of five years’
disposable
income
to
the
plan
constitutes
impermissible peonage.
A debtor in this instance
seems to be compelled to work for five years after
having
pledged
his
future
earnings
to
his
creditors.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court will
have to decide the issue that it has avoided in
the alimony context as to the meaning of peonage.
However, there may be an important distinction
between an involuntary Chapter 11 case and
alimony. The sanction for failure to make alimony
or child support payments may include contempt and
But the failure to make Chapter 11 plan
jail.111
payments would result only in denial of the
discharge and dismissal of the case. Perhaps the
payments could be compelled by a wage assignment,
but there is no sanction other than loss of the
110 Bailey

v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 242 (1911).
e.g., Gruntz v. County of Los Angeles (In re Gruntz), 202
F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000) (360-day jail sentence for failing to
pay child support).
111 See,
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discharge if the debtor quits the job.
The peonage challenge to involuntary Chapter 11
proceedings will present a fascinating issue to
the bankruptcy courts and ultimately to the
Supreme Court.
But it has to be remembered that
rarely have the courts found practices to be
unconstitutional peonage in violation of the
Thirteenth Amendment.
The challenge is made
especially
difficult
because
there
is
no
possibility of contempt or imprisonment for those
who fail to make the required payments.

V. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN THE MEANS
TEST
A. THE MEANS TEST
America is a country that believes in second
Consistent
with
this
belief,
chances.112
bankruptcy laws historically have been used to
give financially beleaguered debtors a second
chance, a clean economic slate.113
Whether, and
when, this second chance continues to be warranted
has been the subject of intense debate for the
past several years.
Under intense pressure by
well-funded creditor lobbying groups,114 Congress
112 A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy Reform: Does the End Justify the
Means?, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 243, 243 (2001).
113 Id.
114 Id. (citing Philip Shenon, Hard Lobbying on Debtor Bill Pays
Dividend, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2001; Christopher H. Schmitt, Tougher
Bankruptcy Laws - Compliments of MBNA?, BUS. WK., Feb. 26, 2001, at
43; Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, Big Money and Politics/Who
Gets Hurt, TIME, May 15, 2000 at 64 (reporting lobbying costs of more
than $ 5 million); Editorial, Bad Ideas on Bankruptcy, WASH. POST, Feb.
18, 2000, at A22 (noting that bankruptcy is in “the spotlight” due to
“some pricey lobbying by financial firms”); Russ Feingold, Lobbyists’
Rush for Bankruptcy Reform, WASH. POST., June 7, 1999, at A19 (“Credit
card companies have spent tens of millions of dollars to push a bill
that legal experts and judges say won’t work.”); Dan Morgan,
Creditors’ Money Talks Louder in Bankruptcy Debate: Consumer Groups
Fight New Curbs on Insolvent Debtors, WASH. POST, Jun. 1, 1999 at A04
(reporting critics’ concern that the drive to overhaul bankruptcy
laws presents “a case study of the impact of money on the political
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has considered and eventually enacted legislation
that imposes a “means test” for bankruptcy relief.
Making potential debtors satisfy a means test,
critics argue, will ensure that bankruptcy relief
is available only to people who can document a
quantifiable need for this economic relief.
Under the new means test contained in Code §
707(b), an “abuse” of the bankruptcy law is
presumed if the amount of the debtor’s income
remaining after deduction of certain expenses and
other specified amounts exceeds the specified
thresholds.
Unless the debtor could demonstrate
“special circumstances” that cause the expected
disposable income to fall below the threshold, the
Chapter 7 case would be dismissed or converted to
a Chapter 13 or Chapter 11 case.115
Application of the means test will vary to some
extent throughout the nation.
The “safe harbor”
hinges on the median family income for the state
of
the
debtor’s
residence,116
and
therefore
application
of
the
means
test
will
vary
significantly from state to state. When the means
test does apply, the expenses that are deducted
from the debtor’s income are not the debtor’s
actual expenses but rather are amounts established
by the IRS based on family size.117
Many of the
expense categories, such as transportation, are
uniform throughout the nation,118 while housing
expenses vary greatly depending on location.
The
housing expense deduction will not even be uniform
throughout a state, because it is governed by the
process”); Jacob M. Schlesinger, Card Games: As Bankruptcies Surge,
Creditors Lobby Hard to Get Harder Laws, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1998, at
A1 (reporting that credit trade group held a $1000-a-head fundraiser
for a chief proponent of bankruptcy reform).
115 For a more detailed analysis of the means test, see Sommer, supra
note 43, at 193-203.
116 Id. at 195.
117 Id. at 197.
118 Id. at 198 (noting that the National Standards for transportation
fail to “take into account large disparities in car insurance costs
that exist within some metropolitan areas”).
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county where the debtor resides.119
Eligibility for Chapter 7 relief will now vary
depending on the state and county where the debtor
resides.
This lack of uniformity raises the
question whether the means test violates the
constitutional requirement that bankruptcy laws be
“uniform.”
B. WHETHER THE MEANS TEST VIOLATES THE BANKRUPTCY UNIFORMITY
CLAUSE
The Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution grants
Congress the power “to establish . . . uniform
laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the
United
States.”120
The
Supreme
Court
has
interpreted this uniformity language in several
contexts.
Chief Justice Marshall observed in the
first interpretation of the Bankruptcy Clause that
“[t]he peculiar terms of the grant [of bankruptcy
power] certainly deserve notice” because “Congress
is not authorized merely to pass laws, the
operation of which shall be uniform, but to
establish uniform laws on the subject throughout
the United States.”121
The only element distinguishing the Bankruptcy
Clause from the other Article I powers is the
concept of “uniformity”: Congress is granted the
power “to establish . . . uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcies throughout the United
States.”122
Indeed,
the
Supreme
Court
has
recognized that the uniformity provision was
intended to authorize a national law enforceable
in whatever state the debtor might be found, as
well as to prohibit private bankruptcy laws
benefiting individual debtors.123
In addition,
“[t]he uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy
119 Id.

at 198.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
121 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 193-94 (1819).
122 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
123 Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 471-72
(1982).
120 U.S.
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Clause is not an Equal Protection Clause for
bankrupts.”124 Just as “the uniformity requirement
is not a straitjacket that forbids Congress to
distinguish among classes of debtors,” there is no
reason to suppose that uniformity requires that
all creditors must be identically subject to
suit.125
“‘Uniformity’ is problematic in the bankruptcy
context because: (i) most laws governing the
substance of relationships between debtor and
creditors are state laws; (ii) these state laws
are incorporated into and applied in the federal
Bankruptcy Code; and (iii) these state laws are
not necessarily uniform.”126
Since debtors and
creditors in similar factual situations will often
receive different treatment in bankruptcy from
state
to
state,
one
might
conclude
that
constitutional uniformity is not achieved by the
bankruptcy law. This type of uniformity (or lack
thereof) has been described by the Supreme Court
as “personal” uniformity.127 For example, a debtor
in California might be liable in bankruptcy on a
claim for breach of a cohabitation agreement,
while a Vermont debtor might not be liable on such
a claim on identical facts.
A debtor in Florida
may be able to exempt a palatial homestead, while
a Pennsylvania debtor may be entitled to almost no
homestead exemption.128
According to Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, a
landmark 1902 Supreme Court decision, all the
Constitution
requires
is
“geographical”
uniformity, rather than personal uniformity.129 In
Moyses, the Court upheld the incorporation of

124 Id.

at 471 n.11.
at 469.
126 Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the
United States, 3 AM. BANKR INST. L. REV. 5, 46 (1995).
127 Id. (citing Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188
(1902)).
128 Id.
129 Moyses, 186 U.S. at 188-90.
125 Id.
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state exemption laws in the 1898 Bankruptcy Act.
Geographical uniformity in this context, the Court
observed, was satisfied “when the trustee takes in
each state whatever would have been available to
the creditor if the bankruptcy law had not been
The purpose of the Uniformity Clause
passed.”130
and
its
requirement
of
strict
geographic
uniformity
was
to
prevent
discrimination
by
131
Congress among the states.
Thus, a bankruptcy law is “uniform” when (i) the
substantive law applied in a bankruptcy case
conforms to that applied outside of bankruptcy
under state law; (ii) the same law is applied to
all debtors within a state and to their creditors;
and (iii) Congress uniformly delegates to the
states the power to fix those laws. The fact that
debtors and creditors in different states may
receive different treatment does not render the
law unconstitutional.132
In 1918, the Court reaffirmed the Moyses
principle in a case involving the use of state
fraudulent conveyance laws in bankruptcy.133
More
recently, lower courts have followed Moyses in
upholding the exemption provisions of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code against uniformity challenges.134
The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue.
Still, the Supreme Court continues to support the
proposition that “the uniformity requirement is
not a straitjacket that forbids Congress to
distinguish among classes of debtors, nor does it
prohibit Congress from recognizing that state laws
do not treat commercial transactions in a uniform
manner.”135
A uniformity issue is also presented when
130 Id.

at 190.
supra note 126, at 46-47; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244

131 Tabb,

(1901).
132 Tabb, supra note 126, at 47.
133 Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918).
134 See, e.g., In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1982).
135 Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 469 (1982).
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Congress passes a bankruptcy law that is not
available to all debtors across the country. The
Court has ruled that private bankruptcy laws for
particular debtors are not permitted.
In recent
years the Supreme Court has twice confronted this
problem
with
regard
to
special
railroad
legislation. In Blanchette v. Connecticut General
Insurance Corp. (The Regional Rail Reorganization
Act Cases),136 the Court upheld the Regional Rail
Reorganization Act although the law was restricted
in its application to the railroads of a single
geographic region.
The saving grace in the law
stemmed from the reality that all of the railroads
then operating under the bankruptcy laws were in
that region; even if the statute had been drafted
to be of general applicability, its operation and
effect
would
have
been
unchanged.137
“The
uniformity provision does not deny Congress power
to take into account differences that exist
between different parts of the country, and to
fashion legislation to resolve geographically
isolated problems.”138
The Court explained that
“[t]he problem dealt with (under the Bankruptcy
Clause) may present significant variations in
different parts of the country.”139
According to
the Court in Railway Labor Executives’ Association
v. Gibbons,140 however, Congress did overreach its
authority in passing a private bankruptcy law that
affected only the employees of the Rock Island
Railroad.141
In conclusion, a bankruptcy law may be “uniform”
even though it incorporates state law so that
there are different results in different States.142
136 419

U.S. 102 (1974).
supra note 126, at 46.
138 Blanchette, 419 U.S. at 159.
139 Id. (citing Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U.S. 440, 463 n.7
(1937)).
140 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
141 Id. at 470-71.
142 Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 469 (1982);
Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918); Hanover Nat’l Bank v.
137 Tabb,

793CHEMERINSKYFINAL

200x)

9/6/2005 1:57 PM

DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE

137

In order to show that the means test violates the
“uniformity” requirement, it would be necessary to
demonstrate how it is violative of “geographic”
uniformity, as opposed to “personal” uniformity.
Perhaps the strongest argument that can be made
against the means test is that its lack of
uniformity within a state—due to the housing
expense that varies by county—violates the Moyses
holding that arguably requires uniform application
within each state.
Since the Supreme Court
already has held that a bankruptcy law may be
uniform even though it incorporates state law and
leads to varying results in different states, it
will be difficult to challenge the means test on
uniformity grounds.
C. WHETHER THE
PRINCIPLES

MEANS

TEST

VIOLATES

EQUAL

PROTECTION

In addition, the uniformity provision does not
forbid Congress to distinguish between different
classes of debtors, different industries, or
different creditors.143
Certain entities, such as
insurance companies and most banks, are not
permitted to file for bankruptcy protection.144
There are special chapters for family farmers145
and
railroads
are
not
and
municipalities,146
permitted to file under Chapter 7 but may file
under Chapter 11.147
However, the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which is applied to the
federal government through the Fifth Amendment,
Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190 (1902) (bankruptcy trustee may “uniformly”
take whatever property is available to creditors under relevant state
law, even though this may have vastly different results in different
states).
143 Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 469 (“The uniformity requirement of the
Bankruptcy Clause is not an Equal Protection Clause for bankrupts.”
Id. at 471 n.11).
144 Code § 109(b)(2).
145 Code §§ 1201 et seq.
146 Code §§ 901 et seq.
147 Code § 109(b)(1) and (d).
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provides that “no state shall . . . deny to any
person
within
its
jurisdiction
the
equal
protection of the laws.” 148 This provision forbids
the government from treating individuals in like
situations differently, which might be the case
under the means test where two individuals with
exactly
the
same
income
receive
different
treatment depending upon the state or county of
their residence.
Because bankruptcy legislation is a form of
economic regulation, only the rational basis test
is used.
In other words, the law will be upheld
so long as it is rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose.
This standard is
very deferential to the government and rarely have
any laws been found to fail the rational basis
test.
The legislative history of BAPCPA states:
[The Act is] a comprehensive package of
reform
measures
pertaining
to
both
consumer and business bankruptcy cases.
The purpose of the bill is to improve
bankruptcy
law
and
practice
by
restoring personal responsibility and
integrity in the bankruptcy system and
ensure that the system is fair for both
debtors and creditors.
With
respect
to
the
interests
of
creditors, the proposed reforms respond
to many of the factors contributing to
the increase in consumer bankruptcy
filings, such as lack of personal
financial
accountability,
the
proliferation of serial filings, and
the absence of effective oversight to
148 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
On its face, this amendment applies
only to the states; however, the Court has found that the federal
government, although not bound by the Fourteenth Amendment, has the
same restriction placed upon them by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
Therefore, neither the states nor the federal
government can deny any person equal protection of the laws.
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eliminate abuse in the system. The
heart of the bill’s consumer bankruptcy
reforms consists of the implementation
of
an
income/expense
screening
mechanism
(“needs-based
bankruptcy
relief” or “means testing”), which is
intended to ensure that debtors repay
creditors
the
maximum
they
can
149
afford.
Therefore,
in
considering
equal
protection
challenges to the means test, courts will need to
consider (1) whether this reflects a legitimate
interest and (2) whether the means test is
rationally related to the achievement of this
goal.150

VI. WHETHER COMPELLED DISCLOSURE OF
TAX RETURNS VIOLATES CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS FOR PRIVACY
A. WHALEN, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, AND CONTROL OVER PRIVATE
INFORMATION
BAPCPA imposes on debtors many new filing and
disclosure requirements. These include § 521(e) &
(f), which require debtors to file tax returns
that must be made available to creditors upon
request.
Do
such
requirements
violate
constitutional rights of privacy?
“The cases sometimes characterized as protecting
‘privacy’ have in fact involved at least two
different kinds of interests.
One is the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, and another is the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions.”151
The new provisions of § 521
implicate the interest “in avoiding disclosure of
149 H.R.

REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1 at (2005) (footnote omitted).
e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
151 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
150 See,

793CHEMERINSKYFINAL

140

AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL

9/6/2005 1:57 PM

(Vol. XX

personal matters.”
The right of privacy has evolved to provide some
protection for the ability of individuals to
determine
what
sort
of
information
about
themselves is collected and how that information
is used.
But privacy in the sense of freedom to
withhold personal financial information from the
government or the public has received little
constitutional protection.152
In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court extended
substantive due process privacy protection to
informational privacy, holding that the “zone of
privacy” protected by the Constitution encompasses
the “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters.”153
The Whalen Court considered
a New York law requiring physicians to disclose
reports
identifying
patients
receiving
prescription drugs that have a potential for
abuse.154 The state maintained a centralized data
file that listed the names and contact information
of the patients and the prescribing doctors. The
challengers of the law argued that this database
infringed the right to privacy because individuals
have a right to avoid disclosure of personal
matters.155 Although the Court did not explicitly
reject the idea that the right of privacy might be
recognized at some point in the future, the
majority decided that the right was not infringed
by the New York law.
Several commentators have observed that if a
system
of
debt
relief
utilizes
extensive
information
about
the
consumer’s
financial
condition to determine if the consumer should
152 See, e.g., O’Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 (1st Cir.
1976); Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 517 P.2d 911 (1974)
(rejecting
an
elected
official’s
attack
on
forced
financial
disclosure).
But cf. California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S.
21, 78-79 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); City of Carmel-by-the-Sea
v. Young, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1, 466 P.2d 225 (1970).
153 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
154 Id.
155 Id. at 598-99.
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repay her debts, there is a strong argument for
gathering all of this information only once in a
proceeding that binds all creditors, thereby
The
avoiding
duplicative
litigation.156
justification is even less compelling in a system
that sets exemptions of income and assets so large
that
the
vast
majority
of
consumers
repay
nothing.157
B. BAPCPA’S PERSONAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
Section
521(a)(1),
as
amended
by
BAPCPA,
requires all debtors to file: (1) copies of all
payment advices or other evidence of payment, if
any, from any employer within sixty days preceding
the bankruptcy filing; (2) a statement of the
amount of monthly net income, itemized to show how
such amount is calculated; and (3) a statement
disclosing any reasonably anticipated increase in
income or expenditures in the twelve-month period
following the date of filing.158
Failure to file
all this information within forty-five days of the
petition may result in automatic dismissal of the
case effective on the forty-sixth day,159 or
dismissal within five days of a request by a party
in interest.160
The only exceptions are that a
debtor may obtain a forty-five day extension upon
motion filed within the initial forty-five days,161
or a trustee may move within the initial fortyfive days for the case not to be dismissed because
the debtor attempted in good faith to file all the
required information and the best interests of
creditors would be served by the administration of
the case.162
156 Richard M. Hynes, Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 121
(2004).
157 Id.
158 Sommer, supra note 43, at 212.
159 Code § 521(i)(1).
160 Code § 521(i)(2).
161 Code § 521(i)(3).
162 Code § 521(i)(4).
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In addition, new § 521(e)(2)(A) requires a
Chapter 7 or 13 individual debtor to provide the
trustee, not later than seven days before the date
first set for the meeting of creditors, a copy of
his or her federal income tax return or transcript
(at the election of the debtor) for the latest
taxable period ending prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy case for which a tax return was
Should the debtor fail to comply with
filed.163
this requirement, the case must be dismissed
unless the debtor demonstrates that such failure
was due to circumstances beyond the debtor’s
control.164 Section 521(e)(2)(C) also requires the
debtor to simultaneously provide a copy of that
tax return or transcript to any creditor who
requests it, enforced by the same remedy of
dismissal unless the debtor demonstrates the
failure was due to circumstances beyond the
debtor’s control.
During the pendency of an individual Chapter 7,
11, or 13 case, the debtor must file with the
court, at the request of the judge, United States
trustee, or any party in interest, at the time
filed with the taxing authority, copies of any
federal
income
tax
returns
(or
transcripts
thereof) that are required to be filed during the
pendency of the case.165
In addition, the debtor
must file copies of any tax returns filed
postpetition for any tax year within three years
prepetition.166
Section 521(g)(2) mandates that the tax returns
and any amendments be made available to the United
States trustee or bankruptcy administrator, the
trustee, and any party in interest for inspection
and
copying,
subject
to
procedures
to
be
established by the Director of the Administrative
Office for United States Courts within 180 days
163 Sommer,

supra note 43, at 213-14.
§ 521(e)(2)(B).
165 Code § 521(f)(1).
166 Code § 521(f)(2).
164 Code
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from the date of enactment of BAPCPA.
The
procedures must “safeguard[] the confidentiality
of any tax information that is required to be
provided”
by
§
521,
and
“shall
include
restrictions
on
creditor
access”
to
such
In addition, the Director must,
information.167
within 540 days from BAPCPA’s enactment date,
prepare and submit to Congress a report that
assesses the effectiveness of such procedures and,
if appropriate, include proposed legislation to
further protect the confidentiality of such tax
information and to impose penalties for its
improper use.168
The issue will be whether these provisions
violate the right to informational privacy.
It
should be noted that regulations are being
promulgated to address the privacy issue and may
be crucial as courts assess whether there are any
privacy problems posed by BAPCPA.
But it does
seem clear that creditors in a case will be
entitled to copies of tax returns, even if the
regulations
prohibit
the
creditors
from
publicizing them further.
Does that compelled
disclosure itself violate the right of privacy as
recognized by Whalen?
Although the Supreme Court
has
not
yet
provided
great
protection
for
informational privacy, this provision of BAPCPA
likely will be vulnerable unless regulations are
adopted to restrict access to such personal
information.
The broad access to tax information
accorded
to
creditors
by
BAPCPA,
without
meaningful limits or safeguards, provides a strong
basis for constitutional challenge.
Such a
challenge might also be made on First Amendment
grounds if the particular debtor’s tax information
revealed donations to churches, political groups,
and charities,169 or income derived from government
167 BAPCPA

§ 315(c)(1) & (2).
§ 315(c)(3).
169 See, e.g., Heyward C. Hosch III, The Interest in Limiting the
Disclosure of Personal Information: A Constitutional Analysis, 36
168 Id.
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disability payments.

VII. WHETHER THE TIME LIMITS FOR
JUDICIAL DECISIONS VIOLATE THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS PRINCIPLE AND DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS IN CASES WHERE THEY
PREVENT A JUDGE FROM GIVING DUE
DELIBERATION BEFORE RENDERING A
DECISION, OR WHERE THEY DO NOT GIVE THE
PARTIES ENOUGH TIME TO COLLECT THEIR
EVIDENCE AND BRIEF THE COURT BEFORE A
HEARING MUST COMMENCE (AND A DECISION
MUST BE ISSUED)
A. JUDICIAL TIME LIMITS AND SEPARATION-OF-POWERS PRINCIPLES
Congress
has
broad
power
to
prescribe
substantive
and
procedural
rules
for
the
judiciary,
but
separation-of-powers
principles
place important limits on that power when its
exercise affects the way in which cases are
decided.170
“Congress clearly has the power to
affect the process of judicial decision-making in
many ways. Courts, for example, must apply valid
congressional statutes as substantive law in cases
to which they apply and even give them preference
VAND. L. REV. 139, 151 n.56 (1983) (“In Alabama ex rel. Patterson, [357
U.S. 449 (1958)], the Court denied effect to a state court order
compelling disclosure by the NAACP of its membership lists and
declared that disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in
controversial advocacy could constitute an effective restraint upon
the first amendment freedom of association [citation omitted].
The
Court emphasized that past revelation of NAACP affiliation had
subjected rank and file members to loss of employment, threats of
physical harm, and other displays of public hostility.
The Court
found
it
foreseeable
that
disclosure
would
affect
adversely
petitioners’ ability to pursue their beliefs and would induce some
members to leave the organization and discourage others from joining
[citation omitted].”).
170 Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional
and Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697 (1995).
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over many other sources of substantive law with
Thus, whenever it
which they may conflict.”171
enacts a substantive statute, Congress controls to
some extent—and possibly to a dispositive extent—
how courts will decide cases.172
In addition, a specific proposal to permit
Congress to regulate the manner in which federal
courts
decide
cases
was
rejected
by
the
Constitutional Convention.
By a 6-2 vote, the
Convention defeated a provision that would have
provided that, in all cases outside the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction, “the judicial power
shall
be
exercised
in
such
manner
as
the
Legislature shall direct.”173
The rejection of
this proposal, which preserved “the otherwise
constitutionally sacrosanct quality of federal
judging,”174 supports the principle of decisional
independence.
Moreover, Congress may not restrict the role of
the judiciary in such a way as to deny due process
of law. On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court
explicitly construed statutes narrowly in order to
avoid preclusion of judicial review altogether.175
B. BAPCPA IMPOSES TIME LIMITS FOR JUDICIAL DECISIONS
BAPCPA amends § 1112(b) to mandate that the
court convert or dismiss a Chapter 11 case,
171 Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of
Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 201 (2001).
172 Id.
173 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1937).
174 James S. Liebman and William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The
Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III
Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 754 n.271 (1998).
175 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process,
Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309
(1993) (noting that the Court considers the underlying substantive
law when it determines whether there is a constitutional right to
judicial review); see also United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S.
828 (1987); McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479
(1991); Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., 509 U.S. 43 (1993); INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
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whichever is in the best interests of creditors
and the estate, if the movant establishes cause,
absent unusual circumstances. In this regard, the
court must specify the circumstances that support
the court’s finding that conversion or dismissal
is not in the best interests of creditors and the
estate.
In addition, an exception to the provision’s
mandatory requirement applies if: (1) the debtor
or a party in interest objects and establishes
that there is a reasonable likelihood that a plan
will be confirmed within the time periods set
forth in §§ 1121(e) and 1129(e), or if these
provisions are inapplicable, within a reasonable
period of time; (2) the grounds for granting such
relief include an act or omission of the debtor
for which there exists a reasonable justification
for such act or omission; and (3) such act or
omission will be cured within a reasonable period
of time.
The court must commence the hearing on a §
1112(b) motion within thirty days of its filing
and must decide the motion not later than fifteen
days after commencement of the hearing unless the
movant expressly consents to a continuance for a
specified
period
of
time
or
compelling
circumstances prevent the court from meeting these
time limits.176
An even tighter time frame is imposed by §
521(i)(2).
It provides that if a party in
interest moves for dismissal on account of the
debtor’s failure to file all documents required by
§
521(a)(1)
within
forty-five
days
of
the
petition, “the court shall enter an order of
dismissal not later than 5 days after such
request.”
While it may be a simple matter of
judicial notice to determine whether the debtor
has filed all schedules and statements required by
§ 521(a)(1), it may require an evidentiary hearing
176 Code

§ 1112(b)(3).
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to determine whether a debtor has filed all
payment
advices
received
within
sixty
days
prepetition from any employer, as required by §
521(a)(1)(B)(iv).
This cannot be determined
simply by the absence of any such payment advices
in the court’s file, because the debtor may have
lost the job more than sixty days prepetition, or
may be paid in cash without any accompanying
payment advices, and nothing else in the file will
necessarily reveal those facts.
Because due
process will undoubtedly require notice to the
debtor of the setting of such an evidentiary
hearing, probably by mail, it seems impossible to
notice the hearing, conduct the hearing and decide
it within five days of the filing of the
creditor’s motion.
The claim will be made that these time limits
infringe separation of powers. This, though, will
be a difficult argument because in other contexts
the Supreme Court has upheld time limits for
decisions imposed by Congress on the federal
courts.
For example, in Miller v. French,177 the
Supreme Court upheld a provision of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act that requires federal courts
to rule within thirty days on a government motion
to
end
an
injunction
concerning
prison
If the court does not act within
conditions.178
thirty days, its earlier injunction must be
stayed.
The argument was that this provision,
imposing a strict time limit on the federal
judiciary, violates separation of powers.
The
Court rejected the separation of powers challenge,
but it did declare that there may be a “serious
question” whether Congress has violated separation
of
powers
principles
if
its
rules
provide
insufficient time for fact-finding “before the
statute invalidates an extant remedial order”:
If
its
legislation
gives
courts
177 530
178 18

U.S. 327 (2000).
U.S.C. § 3626.
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adequate
time
to
determine
the
applicability of a new rule to an old
order and to take the action necessary
to apply it or to vacate the order,
there seems little basis for claiming
that
Congress
has
crossed
the
constitutional line to interfere with
the
performance
of
any
judicial
function. But if determining whether a
new rule applies requires time (say,
for new factfinding) and if the statute
provides insufficient time for a court
to make that determination before the
statute invalidates an extant remedial
order, the application of the statute
raises
a
serious
question
whether
Congress has in practical terms assumed
the judicial function.179
That will be the issue when the time periods
imposed by BAPCPA are considered.
Although the Supreme Court has deferred to
congressionally imposed time limits in other
contexts, there is a strong basis for challenge if
it can be shown that the limits imposed by BPCPA
will prevent bankruptcy courts from providing the
careful consideration that due process requires.
In other cases, like Miller v. French, there was
no claim that the time limits interfered with
courts performing their judicial duties. But that
is exactly the argument that can be made to some
of the time limits imposed by BAPCPA.

CONCLUSION
As mentioned at the outset, other constitutional
issues will undoubtedly arise as BAPCPA is
implemented and its provisions are litigated. The
goal of this Article was merely to highlight some
of the issues that are likely to arise and to
179 Miller,

530 U.S. at 351-52.
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identify the relevant precedents and analysis for
these questions. The only sure conclusion is that
bankruptcy courts will face more constitutional
litigation than ever before.

